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Book Review
Prosecutorial Misconduct
By Bennett L. Gershman. Clark Boardman Company,
Ltd., 1986
Reviewed by John S. Edwardst
The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordi-
nary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation
to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern
at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is
not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As
such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the
law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or
innocence suffer. He may prosecute with earnestness and
vigor - indeed, he should do so. But, while he may strike hard
blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his
duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a
wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring
about a just one.
The preceding words, first expressed in 1935 by Mr. Justice
Sutherland in his landmark opinion in Berger v. United States,1
capture perhaps better than any others the essence and the
weight of the prosecutorial responsibility. The prosecutor's goal
is a lofty one: to see "that guilt shall not escape or innocence
suffer"; 2 to ensure that justice is done. And because he is a pub-
lic official, commissioned to act in the public's best interest
t J.D., Albany Law School, 1978; Executive Assistant District Attorney and Chief
Appellate Attorney, Rockland County District Attorney's Office, 1980-present. Formerly
associated with the firm of Rogers & Wells, New York.
Copyright © 1987, John S. Edwards All Rights Reserved.
1. 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935), quoted in B.L. GERSHMAN, PROSECUTORIAL MlSCONDUCr vii
(1986).
2. Id.
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rather than simply to vindicate the rights of a single victim or
client, the prosecutor is expected to carry out his responsibilities
with the utmost fairness. He must set aside the egotistical desire
to win at any cost, a shortcoming of which many trial lawyers
seemingly suffer. His motivations, as well as his tactics, must be
above reproach at all times. In short, as so aptly stated by Mr.
Justice Sutherland, "while he may strike hard blows, he is not at
liberty to strike foul ones."'3
The prosecutor, however, is not above the shortcomings that
plague the rest of the legal profession. He is just as human as
everyone else. Consequently, it is not surprising to find in-
stances - perhaps far too many - where the prosecutor has
failed to live up to society's high expectations. In his treatise
entitled Prosecutorial Misconduct,4 Bennett L. Gershman ex-
plores in great detail the different ways in which prosecutors,
either carelessly or by design, abuse and breach their public
trust. He takes the reader step by step through the criminal jus-
tice system, noting where the various opportunities for miscon-
duct exist and how prosecutors, over the years, have exploited
those opportunities almost with impunity. He does so, not by
the use of personal anecdotal experiences - although his first-
hand knowledge of this area of the law clearly flavors the
text5 - but rather by extensive citation to hundreds of cases
which seemingly give credence to his concerns.
Two basic themes run throughout the text: 1) the nature
and prevalence of misconduct as a problem; and 2) the failure of
the courts and the legal profession to take effective steps to curb
such abuse. Broadly defined, "prosecutorial misconduct" in-
cludes any situation "in which the prosecutor engages in im-
proper behavior usually to gain an unfair advantage over the ac-
cused or otherwise to prejudice the trier of fact." In the
author's view, such misconduct pervades the prosecutorial pro-
cess. It often surfaces as early as the investigative stage where
police (with or without the blessing of the Government's attor-
3. Id.
4. B.L. GERSHMAN, PROSCUTroRIAL MISCONDUCT (1986).
5. Gershman tells us in the Introduction that prior to entering academic circles he
served as an assistant district attorney in the New York County office of Frank S. Hogan
and as an assistant special prosecutor under Maurice H. Nadjari.
6. B.L. GERSHMAN, supra note 4 § 2.1, at 2-4.
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ney) sometimes create crime where it otherwise would not exist
by utilizing such tactics as entrapment and improper sting oper-
ations. Additional examples of misconduct in the investigative
process include illegal electronic eavesdropping, conducted with-
out or beyond the scope of prior court approval, and the use of
informants (sometimes co-defendants) to intrude surreptitiously
on meetings between a defendant and his attorney or to cleverly
elicit incriminating statements under circumstances violative of
a defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel. Thus, the term
"prosecutor," like misconduct, is used broadly by the author to
include the police and any other person working with or at the
behest of the Government in the investigative process.7
The area perhaps most rife with the opportunity for, if not
the actual occurrence of, misconduct is undoubtedly the process
by which persons are initially charged with and ultimately plead
guilty to criminal conduct.$ Few will deny that the prosecutor is
a powerful figure in criminal justice. It is he who decides whom
to charge, when to charge, how to charge and what to charge.
Similarly, it is he who decides whether and on what terms a plea
bargain should be made. Indeed, in some jurisdictions, he may
even insist that a particular sentence be imposed as a condition
of his consent to the plea bargain.' In the view of the author and
most other commentators, the reason for his power lies largely in
one word - "discretion." Discretion is defined as "the power
or right to decide or act according to one's own judgment";10 and
the prosecutor's discretion in the above matters is virtually
unfettered.
It is thus appropriate that the author should devote several
chapters to the charging and plea processes. For example, the
treatise explores in considerable detail the problems of selective,
vindictive and demagogic prosecutions. Although a prosecutor
7. Id. § 1.1, at 1-3.
8. It is estimated that between 75 and 90% of all convictions are by plea. Id. § 7.1,
it 7-2.
9. In People v. Farrar, 52 N.Y.2d 302, 419 N.E.2d 864, 437 N.Y.S.2d 961 (1981), the
New York State Court of Appeals held that where a plea offer is conditioned by the
prosecution upon the imposition of a specified minimum sentence the prosecution has
:he right to withdraw consent to the bargain, effectively nullifying it, if the court con-
•ludes that a lesser sentence would be more appropriate.
10. B.L. GEasHmN, supra note 4 § 4.2(a), at 4-4.
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cannot be compelled to file charges or, in most instances, to pro-
ceed with charges though filed," it does not perforce follow that
there are no constitutional limitations on whom and with what
motivation a prosecutor may decide to charge. Clearly, he may
not consciously single out a defendant for prosecution based on
race or some other impermissible classification. Nor may a pros-
ecutor penalize a defendant who has successfully exercised his
right to appeal by thereafter charging him with a higher grade
offense based on the same facts and circumstances.12 On the
other hand, courts have upheld selective prosecutions based
upon the defendant's membership in organized crime, his partic-.
ular occupation (if it involves a special responsibility to uphold
the law), and even the defendant's prominence in the commu-
nity.13 They have likewise upheld - in the absence of proof of
"actual" vindictiveness - the use of threats by the prosecutor
to file higher charges, to "up the ante" in the author's words, if
the defendant does not agree to plead guilty to the charges then
pending.1 4
No thorough discussion of prosecutorial misconduct in the
charging process would be complete without some reference to
the grand jury. Appropriately, the author devotes an entire
chapter to this topic.16 When first introduced in England in
1166,16 the grand jury was intended to serve as a buffer between
the ordinary man and the awesome power of the sovereign. In
recent years, however, it has come increasingly under attack as
more a sword of the prosecutor than a shield for the individual.
The reasons offered to support such a claim derive largely from
the nature of the institution itself, which in fact does vest a
great deal of power in the hands of the prosecutor. It is, of
course, a secret body, the nature of whose proceedings is known
only to the grand jurors, its witnesses and the prosecutor. It is
presided over by the prosecutor who acts as both judge and ad-
vocate. It is the prosecutor who decides what evidence the grand
jury will hear and, more importantly, what evidence it will not
11. Id. § 4.2(c), at 4-7.
12. Id. § 4.4, at 4-28 to 4-29.
13. Id. § 4.3(d)(6), at 4-22 to 4-24.
14. Id. § 4.4(a)(2)(A), at 4-31; Id. § 7.2(i)(2), at 7-14 to 7-16.
15. Id. at ch. 2.
16. D.M. WALKER , THE OxFoRD COMPAMON To LAw 534 (1980).
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hear. Additionally, and of no small consequence, there is no
right of confrontation before the grand jury. Indeed, in the fed-
eral system, as in a majority of the states which still retain the
institution, a witness is not even permitted to have counsel pre-
sent while he testifies. 7
In light of the nature of the process, it is no great wonder
that examples of flagrant prosecutorial abuse in the grand jury
can readily be found in the cases. The author methodically cata-
logs a wide variety of such abuses. Among those cited are: 1) the
suppression of evidence favorable to the accused;16 2) the use of
"shoddy" evidence (hearsay and otherwise unreliable or mislead-
ing evidence);' 9 3) coercion of the grand jury vote to obtain a
desired result;20 and 4) deliberate deception.2 Prosecutorial mis-
conduct, we are shown, may also involve improper examina-
tion - a technique which takes particular advantage of the ab-
sence of immediate judicial supervision. Such misconduct
includes the harassment of witnesses, attempts to elicit privi-
leged matters and the use of abusive and inflammatory
remarks."'
Notably, the author does not attempt to answer the burning
question of whether the abuse and the opportunities for abuse
by the prosecution are so great as to warrant abolition of the
grand jury. He simply calls attention to what history has already
written. In doing so, however, he quite plainly provides propo-
nents of abolition or other reform with an arsenal of weapons
with which to fight their battle. On the other hand, those wish-
ing to take up the banner of grand jury reform should be pre-
pared to address a variety of practical arguments, not mentioned
by the author, which favor retention of the time-honored institu-
tion. Similarly, they should be prepared to recognize that grand
jury systems differ from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and that not
all suffer the myriad of faults described in the text.28
17. B.L. GERSHMAN, supra note 4 § 2.1, at 2-3 to 2-4 n.9.
18. Id. § 2.6(b), at 2-37 to 2-38.
19. Id. § 2.7, at 2-43 to 2-47.
20. Id. § 2.8(b), at 2-48 to 2-49.
21. Id. § 2.6(d)(1), at 2-42 to 2-43.
22. Id. § 2.3, at 2-11 to 2-17; Id. § 2.4, at 2-17 to 2-30.
23. New York's grand jury system, for example, is much more solicitous of the rights
of defendants and more restrictive of the role of the prosecutor than is its federal coun-
19871
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In the author's view, the plea bargaining process provides a
particularly fertile setting for misconduct, again largely because
of the power which the prosecutor wields at that stage of the
proceedings.2 4 As previously mentioned, the prosecutor has vir-
tually unfettered discretion to grant or to withhold plea bar-
gains. And, even though many offices have written guidelines
covering this area, such wide-ranging discretion, nevertheless, ef-
fectively enables the prosecutor to exert a considerable amount
of pressure - some proper and some improper - in his effort
to extract a plea. For example, he can induce a guilty plea by
simply offering to accept a plea to a lesser offense. Implicit
therein is a threat of more severe punishment should the de-
fendant refuse the plea offer and ultimately be convicted of a
greater offense. Other guilty pleas have been induced by
promises of leniency in the treatment of third persons, usually
family members. Although the Supreme Court has not squarely
addressed the propriety of such plea offers, it has noted that
they do pose a greater danger of inducing false guilty pleas than
do agreements in which the consideration inures directly to the
defendant.2 ' Several other courts, however, have concluded that
there is "no intrinsic constitutional infirmity" in plea agree-
ments involving third party beneficiaries."' The author notes
that the courts are divided on whether it is impermissibly coer-
cive to require a defendant to waive his right to appeal as a con-
dition of a plea bargain.
Prosecutors, of course, may not induce pleas by fraud or
terpart. Thus, unlike the federal system, New York does not permit the introduction of
hearsay evidence and applies the same rules of corroboration as apply at trial. N.Y. Cra.
PROC. LAw § 190.30(1) (McKinney 1982). When charges are pending against a defendant
in a local criminal court, he is entitled, as a matter of right, to testify before the grand
jury and the failure to afford such a right will result in the dismissal of the indictment.
Id. § 190.50(5). Further, any witness who testifies under a waiver of immunity has the
right to have an attorney present in the room to advise him. Id. § 190.52.
24. B.L GERSHMAN, supra note 4 § 7.1, at 7-2 to 7-4.
25. Id. § 7.2(e)(1), at 7-7 n.34 (quoting Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364
n.8 (1978)).
26. See, e.g., United States v. Nuckols, 606 F.2d 566, 569 (5th Cir. 1979). See Mosier
v. Murphy, 790 F.2d 62, 66 (10th Cir. 1986); United States v. Castello, 724 F.2d 813, 815
(9th Cir. 1984); United States v. Diaz, 733 F.2d 371, 375 (5th Cir. 1984); United States v.
Usher, 703 F.2d 956, 958 (6th Cir. 1983); Harman v. Mohn, 683 F.2d 834, 838 (4th Cir.
1982); United States v. Carlino, 400 F.2d 56, 58 (2d Cir. 1968).
27. B.L. GERSHMAN, supra note 4 § 7.2(h) at 7-10.1 to 7-13.
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false promises. And, once a bargain is consummated (by entry of
a plea), the prosecution is bound to honor its terms. Whether a
breach will be remedied by vacatur of the plea or specific per-
formance of the agreement apparently depends upon the juris-
diction involved and the facts and circumstances of the particu-
lar case.2 8
For practicing trial lawyers - prosecutors and defense at-
torneys alike - the author's discussion of "Forensic Miscon-
duct" 9 is enormously instructive. Focusing primarily on the
proper limits of prosecutorial comment on summation, the trea-
tise examines virtually every form of improper comment imagi-
nable, both the subtle and the not so subtle alike. What types of
comments implicate a defendant's constitutional right to remain
silent? Clearly, a prosecutor may not directly advert to a defend-
ant's failure to testify, but may he even allude to the fact by
employing words such as "uncontradicted," or "unrefuted," or
"undenied"? The author tells us no. Is there a difference be-
tween "post-arrest" silence and "post-Miranda" silence? When
judged according to federal constitutional standards, there ap-
parently is. It is grossly improper to comment on a defendant's
silence after he has been advised that he has an absolute right to
remain silent and has chosen to exercise that right. When, how-
ever, a defendant's post-arrest silence precedes Miranda warn-
ings, the prosecutor may use that silence to impeach and to ar-
gue guilt without violating due process2°
A prosecutor, of course, may not engage in name-calling, nor
appeal to the fears, sympathies or emotions of the jurors. The
so-called "safe streets" argument s' is but one example of such an
improper plea to the jury's fear of crime. The treatise also exam-
ines how a prosecutor sometimes relies on evidence outside the
record, or brings before a jury matters which have properly been
28. Id. § 7.5(b), at 7-29 to 7-31.
29. Id. at ch. 10. Although devoted primarily to summations, Chapter 10 also ad-
dresses, albeit briefly, misconduct in opening statements.
30. Id. § 10.3(c), at 10-24 to 10-26.
31. The "safe streets" argument refers to any appeal by the prosecutor to the jurors'
general fear of crime and of what might happen if the defendant is allowed to go free.
See, e.g., People v. Galloway, 54 N.Y.2d 396, 401, 430 N.E.2d 885, 887, 446 N.Y.S.2d 9,
11 (1981); People v. Young, 113 A.D.2d 852, 854, 493 N.Y.S.2d 516, 518 (1985); People v.
Watson, 111 A.D.2d 888, 888, 491 N.Y.S.2d 24, 25 (1985).
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excluded.
One point of criticism is warranted. In his chapter on foren-
sic misconduct, the author appears to lose his objectivity - at
least somewhat. More so than in earlier chapters, his style, when
discussing misconduct on summation, seems to implicate prose-
cutors more generally - almost as a class - in such abuse.
Rather than objectively identifying specific areas of, or opportu-
nities for, misconduct in the criminal process and discussing rel-
evant examples of such misconduct, he frequently prefaces an
example with a generalization such as "prosecutors frequently,"
"prosecutors often" or "prosecutors also," as if suggesting that.
prosecutors as a class routinely engage in such misconduct.33
Whether they do or not is obviously a matter on which reason-
able minds may differ. While the existence of such widespread
misconduct may reflect the personal experience of the author,
the authorities cited cannot be said to support such a broad
claim.
Nor should the reader be misled into believing that the
prosecution is governed by rules separate and distinct from
those which govern the conduct of the defense. Defense counsel
is no more entitled than is the prosecutor to resort to inflam-
matory language, to consciously seek to deceive or mislead the
court or the jury, to refer to matters not in evidence or to ex-
press his personal opinion as to the credibility of a witness or
the guilt or innocence of the defendant."3 Although the prosecu-
tor may be held to a higher standard on review because he is a
public official, both the courts and the public have a right to
expect that criminal matters will be tried fairly by both sides.
Indeed, it is for that very reason that courts often cite provoca-
tion by the defense in answer to claims of forensic misconduct
by the prosecutor.
At the outset, I noted that the author weaved two basic
themes throughout the text. The second of these was the failure
on the part of the courts and the legal profession to take effec-
tive steps to curb the seemingly increasing incidence of
32. See, e.g., B.L. GERSHMAN, supra note 4 § 10.5, at 10-28; Id. § 10.6(b), at 10-36;
Id. § 10.6(f), at 10-40.
33. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-106 (1980); STANDARDS
FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 4-1.1 et seq. (2d ed. 1982).
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prosecutorial misconduct. The remedies available to an ag-
grieved defendant naturally turn on the nature of the miscon-
duct involved. Most chapters in the text, therefore, include at
least a superficial discussion of the remedies appropriate to the
particular form of misconduct addressed therein. In the final
chapter, however, the author deals solely with the topic of sanc-
tions. It is his thesis - shared, he says, by courts and other
commentators alike - that "existing sanctions are either too
infrequently employed or ineffective to punish or prevent
misconduct."3 4
What are the existing sanctions and why don't they work?
Sanctions for misconduct naturally include reversal of the con-
viction, suppression of tangible and testimonial evidence, con-
tempt and civil damages. They also include removal of the pros-
ecutor from public office, censure, suspension, perhaps even
disbarment and various lesser judicial punishments.
Apparently, there is a split of authority concerning whether
reversal and suppression are effective restraints on misconduct.
Some commentators believe that they are not because such mea-
sures penalize society with very little effect on the offending
party. Others believe that they are effective because they impact
directly on the prestige of the offender and consequently on his
office and, therefore, result in the unfavorable attention of the
individual's superiors. In any event, because they are not gener-
ally viewed as disciplinary tools, such remedies are infrequently
invoked.
Contempt, likewise, has been ineffective in large measure
because of the hesitancy on the part of the courts to impose it.
The same appears true of bar association and grievance commit-
tee proceedings. In the author's view, "[a]lthough bar associa-
tions frequently make bold and lofty pronouncements about
self-policing and requiring attorneys to conform to the high
standards of the profession, a review of their records of disci-
plining prosecutors for misconduct is disappointing."" Finally,
civil suits are always available as a private recourse, but fre-
quently they are stymied by prosecutorial immunity.
What then is the answer? Can misconduct on the part of
34. B.L. GERSHMAN, supra note 4 § 13.1, at 13-1.
35. Id. § 13.6, at 13-16.
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prosecutors be curbed? The author does not appear optimistic.
The range of available sanctions seems sufficiently broad pro-
vided they are invoked. Yet, how to encourage the courts and
the bar associations to take hold of the reins and utilize the
powers they clearly possess is a question the treatise leaves
unanswered.
The topics discussed in this review are only a sampling of
those raised and thoroughly examined by the author. Miscon-
duct in our criminal justice system - a system which deals in
human lives and not simply in property rights - is undeniably
a problem of grave concern. Whether it is as pervasive a problem
as the author suggests might well result in differing opinions.
But that it occurs at all is sufficient cause for alarm.
At the risk of being overly simplistic, perhaps the solution
to the problem can be found in its cause. Generally speaking,
prosecutors as a group tend to be young - in experience, if not
necessarily in years. Except in the larger metropolitan offices,
the extent of their post-graduate training is primarily received
on the job and in the courtroom. They learn their craft from
other, more experienced, but similarly trained practitioners in a
highly competitive environment. These factors suggest that most
of the wide range of misconduct discussed in the text may as
readily be attributed to inexperience as to design. Indeed, in my
judgment, inexperience is a more likely cause than any other, for
surely there is no basis for imputing some fundamental lack of
integrity to an entire profession.
If indeed that is the case, then Prosecutorial Misconduct
will be a valuable addition to the libraries of both prosecutors
and defense counsel. It is a well researched, objective presenta-
tion in an area of the law long overlooked by other commenta-
tors. At first glance, prosecutors may be offended by the author's
failure to lay any blame at the doorstep of the defense. They
should not be. The purpose of the text is obviously not to assign
blame, but rather to instruct and to inform. A prosecutor who is
aware of the constitutional, statutory and ethical limits on his
conduct, and who understands what the law requires of a "fun-
damentally fair" proceeding, will be a better, more effective
prosecutor. It follows also that a defense attorney who has a firm
grasp on the proper limits of the prosecutor's conduct (and, of
[Vol. 7:463
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course, of his own) will be better equipped to protect his client's
rights. I highly recommend this text to all criminal law
practitioners.
11
